A diplomatic framework between Washington and Tehran has been confirmed, ending months of speculation. The agreement, brokered through Omani intermediaries, covers nuclear enrichment limits and sanctions relief. Yet for those who lived through the 2020 escalation, the deal provokes a more uncomfortable reckoning: what exactly was the war for?
The United States and Iran have not fought a direct, declared war. But the campaign of maximum pressure, the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against US bases in Iraq constituted a shadow conflict that cost lives, destabilised the region, and deepened mistrust. Now, the same actors who traded threats sit across a negotiating table.
Officials familiar with the talks describe a pragmatic accord. Iran will cap enrichment at 60% and permit expanded IAEA inspections. In return, the US will unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets and ease sanctions on non-oil trade. Neither side declares victory. Neither side admits defeat. The deal is functional, not transformational.
But the functionalism itself is the problem. If the Soleimani strike was intended to force Iranian capitulation, the deal suggests the opposite outcome. If the pressure campaign was designed to cripple Iran’s nuclear programme, the deal tacitly acknowledges that Iran retains the knowledge and capacity to reconstitute it. If the goal was regime change, Washington is now negotiating with the same regime.
Analysts point to a pattern. Every US administration since 2002 has pursued a policy of containment or rollback toward Iran. None has achieved a clear end state. The 2015 JCPOA slowed Iran’s programme but did not eliminate it. The Trump administration’s withdrawal aimed to replace that deal with a stronger one but produced only escalation. Now President Biden returns to a version of the original bargain, with modest adjustments.
The question of what the war was for is therefore not rhetorical. It demands an accounting from policymakers who authorised strikes, sanctioned economies, and mobilised public opinion against an enemy now being engaged as a partner. The human cost is measurable: thousands dead in Iraq and Syria, billions in destroyed infrastructure, and a generation of Iranians radicalised against the West.
There are pragmatic arguments for the deal. Non-proliferation remains a vital interest. Diplomacy is preferable to war. The agreement may reduce the risk of an Israeli unilateral strike, which would be far more destructive. But these arguments do not answer the moral question. They merely postpone it.
Bowen, a former US intelligence official who advised the Obama administration, described the deal as “necessary but painful.” He noted that the agreement does not address Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its support for proxy militias. Those issues remain unresolved, pushed to future negotiations that may never come.
The deal also exposes the incoherence of US strategy in the Middle East. Washington seeks to reduce its military footprint while maintaining alliances with Gulf states that view Iran as an existential threat. It urges Israel to exercise restraint while providing it with advanced weapons. It demands Iranian compliance with non-proliferation norms while refusing to codify its own commitments in a legally binding treaty.
For the region, the deal offers a fragile pause. Gulf states have already begun recalibrating their diplomatic posture, reopening embassies and trade routes. Israel watches with alarm, preparing contingency plans. The real test will come in implementation: whether inspections are permitted, whether sanctions relief reaches ordinary Iranians, and whether both sides resist the temptation to cheat.
But the inescapable question remains. If the United States and Iran can reach a deal now, after years of bloodshed and brinkmanship, what justified the violence in the first place? To ask the question is not to oppose the deal. It is to insist that the institutions responsible for the conflict be held to the same standard of accountability they demand of others.
