Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s international editor, has posed a question that cuts to the bone of Western strategy in the Middle East. If Iran emerges from the current conflict with its nuclear programme intact, its regional proxies emboldened and its influence undiminished, then what precisely was the purpose of the past two decades of military intervention and diplomatic pressure? The question is not rhetorical. It demands an answer from the governments in Washington, London and Tel Aviv.
Bowen’s intervention comes at a moment of acute uncertainty. The war in Gaza has entered its sixth month with no clear end in sight. Israel’s military objectives, the dismantling of Hamas and the recovery of hostages, remain unachieved. Meanwhile, Iran has watched from a safe distance as its principal adversary has become bogged down in a costly ground campaign. The United States has been drawn into a series of peripheral confrontations with Iranian-backed groups in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The Houthis continue to disrupt Red Sea shipping. Hezbollah has fired rockets into northern Israel on an almost daily basis. Iran itself has not suffered a single direct military strike.
Diplomatically, the Islamic Republic has also gained ground. The Biden administration’s efforts to revive the nuclear deal collapsed in 2023. Since then, Iran has expanded its uranium enrichment beyond weapons-grade thresholds. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran now possesses enough fissile material for several nuclear devices. Negotiations have been suspended. Sanctions remain in place but have failed to alter Tehran’s calculus. The regime has weathered domestic protests, economic hardship and international isolation. It has emerged as the indispensable broker for any future regional security arrangement.
The notion that Iran has ‘won’ is, of course, a simplification. Wars do not end with victory parades for states that avoid direct combat. But the strategic picture is unambiguous. The United States has announced the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia has reconciled with Iran in a Chinese-brokered deal. The UAE has reopened its embassy in Tehran. The Gulf states that once bankrolled the containment of Iran are now hedging their bets. Bowen’s question, therefore, is not simply about the war in Gaza. It is about the entire post-2003 architecture of American power in the Middle East.
The question is also political. In Britain, the Foreign Office has avoided public scrutiny of this shift. The government continues to speak of ‘de-escalation’ and ‘humanitarian pauses’ while refusing to define success. The official line is that Iran is weaker today because of sanctions and support for Ukraine. But the evidence suggests otherwise. Iran’s drone exports to Russia have not been curtailed. Its oil exports have reached new highs despite Western embargoes. The regime has used the crisis to consolidate its internal security apparatus and suppress dissent.
There is a historical parallel. In the 1970s, the United States fought a war in Vietnam that ended with the victory of its adversaries. The lesson drawn was that military power had limits. The same lesson is now being taught in the Middle East. The difference is that Iran is not a peasant army in the jungle. It is a sophisticated state with a nuclear programme, a network of proxies and a clear strategic doctrine. The question Bowen asks is therefore not just uncomfortable. It is existential.
The answer, should any leader dare to provide it, will determine the future of the region. If the war was for nothing, then the West must accept a new reality in which Iran is the dominant power. If the war was for something, then the objectives must be redefined and the strategy overhauled. Silence is not a response. Bowen’s question hangs in the air. It will not be ignored.
