In what the Ministry of Defence is calling a 'significant blow to global terrorism', British intelligence reportedly provided critical support for the elimination of a senior Islamic State commander in a joint US-Nigerian raid. The operation, conducted in northern Nigeria, marks a rare public acknowledgement of UK special forces' involvement in kinetic operations in the Sahel.
Let us be clear: this is not a humanitarian mission. This is a targeted assassination authorised by Whitehall, presumably after a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The question is: what did we get for our investment?
From a purely fiscal perspective, the UK's contribution likely involved signals intelligence and surveillance assets, both of which carry substantial price tags. The SAS has been operating in the region for years, but each deployment drains the Treasury's coffers. The Ministry of Defence's budget is already stretched thin, with equipment shortages and recruitment crises. Every pound spent on this raid is a pound not spent on fixing the Army's ageing Warrior vehicles.
Yet the commander's removal may yield dividends. Islamic State (West Africa) has been on the back foot since 2016, but it remains a resilient franchise. Eliminating senior figures disrupts operations and, in theory, reduces the threat to British interests. But here is the rub: we have been playing whack-a-mole with IS leadership for years. For every commander killed, two more emerge. The market in terrorism has low barriers to entry.
The real story is the diplomatic calculus. This operation reinforces the special relationship with the United States, which is currently trading at a premium given the volatility in transatlantic ties. It also burnishes our credentials with Nigeria, a key partner in the fight against Boko Haram. But let us not forget Nigeria's human rights record. The Nigerian military has been accused of extrajudicial killings and corruption. By partnering with them, we are implicitly endorsing their methods. That might come back to bite us in the equity markets of international law.
Then there is the issue of market reaction. Gilt yields have been creeping up as investors fret about the cost of global military engagements. The UK's debt-to-GDP ratio is already above 100 per cent. Missions like this, while small in absolute terms, signal an appetite for intervention that could escalate. The bond market does not like uncertainty.
In the end, the raid was a tactical success but a strategic question mark. We eliminated one commander. We proved our reach. But we also committed resources to a conflict with no exit strategy. The bottom line: this was a targeted investment in security, but the returns are uncertain. Shareholders in British security should demand a clearer dividend policy.
As always, the market will judge us on results, not intentions.
