Let’s be clear. The idea that Cuba is a benign actor in the Western Hemisphere is a strategic indulgence we can no longer afford. Senator Marco Rubio’s warning, corroborated by UK intelligence sources, forces a cold, hard look at threat vectors we have dangerously neglected. This is not about Cold War nostalgia. This is about current force posture, cyber enablement, and logistics chokepoints.
First, the hardware. Havana’s signals intelligence facilities are not museum pieces. They are active ELINT platforms. They monitor US and allied air and naval traffic out of Guantanamo, Key West, and the Florida Strait. The equipment is Russian-sourced, modernised in the last five years. The SIGINT footprint is real. If you are running carrier operations in the Atlantic, Cuba is a listening post for a hostile actor. That is a fact, not a political statement.
Second, the logistics vector. Cuba sits astride critical SLOCs. The Yucatan Channel, the Windward Passage. Any disruption to those sea lines in a crisis – a denial-of-service attack on shipping, a mine threat, a submarine transit – and NATO reinforcement timelines for the European theatre collapse. We have modelled this. The US Southern Command has modelled this. The gap between our assumptions and actual readiness is a strategic liability.
Third, the cyber dimension. Cuban state-sponsored cyber activity is not a meme. The APT groups operating out of Havana are targeting energy infrastructure, financial systems, and military networks across the continent. This isn’t hacktivism. It is intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Rubio’s warning is late, but it is correct. We have ignored the network warfare threat because it does not fit the narrative of a fading adversary.
The intelligence failure here is not that Cuba is a threat. It is that we allowed the threat to mature while we argued about outdated paradigms. Every base on that island is a potential staging point for electronic warfare, denial operations, or intelligence collection. Every diplomatic opening was a cover for technical exploitation. That is the pattern.
So what is the operational answer? First, reassess the intelligence priority. Cuba must return to the tier-one threat list for SIGINT and counter-cyber operations. Second, joint exercises with allied naval forces must include anti-access area denial scenarios that assume Cuban-based ISR feeds into adversary targeting. Third, we need a public posture that deters miscalculation. Rubio is doing that. But words are cheap. We need capability, positioning, and a willingness to compete.
The chess move is obvious. The question is whether NATO has the strategic stamina to counter it. Based on current readiness metrics, I am not optimistic. The threat vector is active. The pivot must start now.
