The World Health Organization has issued a stark warning: the Democratic Republic of Congo is facing a ‘catastrophic collision’ between the Ebola virus and ongoing armed conflict. This is not merely a public health crisis. It is a strategic vulnerability that hostile actors will seek to exploit.
From a threat assessment perspective, the convergence of disease and insurgency creates a multi-dimensional risk. The Ebola outbreak, now in its second wave, is centred in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. These regions are already a battlefield. Dozens of armed groups operate there, including the Allied Democratic Forces and remnants of the March 23 Movement. The Congolese army, already overstretched, must now divide its attention between counterinsurgency operations and enforcing quarantine measures.
The logistics of containment are failing. Contact tracing is hampered by active hostilities. Healthcare workers are being attacked. In 2019, a Médecins Sans Frontières treatment centre was deliberately torched. This is not accidental. It is a deliberate targeting of soft infrastructure. The same groups that profit from illegal mining and extortion see health response teams as a threat to their control.
There is a clear intelligence failure here. Early warning systems for disease outbreaks have been compromised by the security vacuum. The WHO’s Emergency Committee has called for a ‘reset’ of the response, but that requires a ceasefire. A ceasefire that no major power has the leverage to enforce. The United Nations peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, has limited capacity to secure health zones while also protecting civilians from militia attacks.
Now consider the geo-strategic implications. An uncontrolled Ebola outbreak in central Africa has the potential to destabilise neighbouring states. Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi all share porous borders with the affected region. Any of these nations could see cross-border transmission. That would trigger border closures, economic disruption, and potential military mobilisations. Hostile state actors, such as those seeking to divert international attention or resources, would welcome such a scenario.
Moreover, the psychological dimension cannot be ignored. The perception of a failing state in the heart of Africa emboldens non-state actors. It undermines global health security. The current outbreak is the second-largest in history, and the response is already critically underfunded. The WHO’s appeal for $98 million is only 47 per cent funded. That is a resource gap that adversaries will note.
In military doctrine, we call this a ‘threat multiplier’. The Ebola outbreak is not a standalone problem. It is a catalyst for further instability. The international community must treat this as a security emergency, not just a medical one. That means deploying military logistics assets to support vaccination campaigns. It means providing secure communications for contact tracers. It means integrating intelligence sharing between health authorities and security forces.
The cost of inaction is calculable. Every day that passes without a coordinated security-health intervention increases the probability of a regional collapse. The WHO’s warning is not hyperbole. It is a cold assessment of operational reality. We ignore it at our peril.
