The seizure of millions in assets from the Italian mafia, hailed as a triumph for British-led Europol operations, signals a rare win in the ongoing war against transnational organised crime. But let us strip away the congratulatory veneer and examine the operational reality. This was not a strategic masterstroke; it was a reactive move, exploiting a vulnerability that should have been exploited years ago.
The 'Ndrangheta, the Calabrian mafia, has long operated with near-impunity, its tentacles reaching into legitimate economies across Europe. Their ability to launder money through shell companies, real estate, and cryptocurrency has been a persistent threat vector, one that Western intelligence has consistently failed to neutralise. This operation, code-named 'Operation Polyphemus', may have frozen accounts and seized villas, but it has not cut off the head of the hydra.
The 'Ndrangheta's financial networks are resilient, their loyalties absolute. A single seizure, however applauded by politicians, is a tactical victory at best. The real question is whether Europol has the intelligence infrastructure to sustain this pressure.
Cross-border asset tracing requires real-time data sharing, something that has been hamstrung by bureaucratic infighting and national sovereignty concerns. The UK, post-Brexit, has been pushing for closer law enforcement ties, but the EU remains wary. This operation may be a showcase of what is possible, but it also highlights the fragility of such cooperation.
The mafia adapts. They always do. The seizure will be followed by a strategic pivot.
New shell companies, new jurisdictions, new cryptocurrencies. The threat vector shifts. And we, the defenders, must be ready to shift with it.
But are we? The UK's National Crime Agency has been starved of resources, its cyber capabilities lagging behind the private sector. The mafia's use of encrypted communications and dark web markets is evolving faster than our ability to intercept them.
This asset seizure is a necessary step, but it is not a turning point. It is a reminder that the war against organised crime is a long, attritional conflict. And in such conflicts, logistics and intelligence are paramount.
The mafia has both in abundance. Europe's law enforcement agencies, meanwhile, are still fighting the last war. They celebrate seizures while the enemy consolidates its power.
Until we address the structural failures in intelligence sharing and cyber readiness, operations like this will remain exceptions, not the rule. The mafia is a hostile state actor in all but name. It is time we treated it as such.
