The news from Berlin is stark. Germany, Europe's largest economy and a self-styled leader in the Energiewende, is actively considering a return to coal-fired power generation. This is not a fringe proposal. It is a contingency being openly discussed by government officials as the continent grapples with an energy crisis that shows no signs of abating. For Britain, which has prided itself on a rapid phase-out of coal and ambitious net-zero targets, this development forces a reassessment of our own energy security and the stability of the entire European decarbonisation timeline.
The physics of the situation is simple: when the wind doesn't blow and the sun doesn't shine, renewables cannot meet baseload demand. Germany's nuclear phase-out, completed in 2023, removed a reliable low-carbon source from the grid. Now, with Russian gas supplies curtailed and liquefied natural gas prices volatile, the backup option many hoped would bridge the gap: coal. Germany's coal-fired plants, many of which were slated for permanent closure, are being held in reserve. The German cabinet has approved a law allowing for their temporary reactivation. The Ministry of Economics has been explicit: this is a crisis measure.
The UK must take note. Our own energy mix still relies on gas for 40% of electricity. We are not immune to the same international pressures. While Britain has been more successful in deploying offshore wind, the intermittency problem remains. The National Grid has already paid wind farms to shut down on particularly gusty days to prevent overload. The idea that we can simply replace all fossil fuels with renewables without massive overcapacity or cost-effective storage is a fantasy. Germany's struggle is our future unless we invest heavily in grid-scale batteries, pumped hydro, hydrogen, or new nuclear.
Germany's decision carries a deeper lesson: net-zero strategies that ignore geopolitical reality are fragile. The UK's own net-zero strategy, updated in 2023, relies heavily on electrification and the assumption that the grid will be decarbonised by 2035. But if Germany, with its renewable capacity and technological prowess, cannot avoid coal during a crisis, what does that mean for a less industrialised nation? The carbon budget does not care about intentions. Emissions from coal are about double those of natural gas per unit of energy. A return to coal even for a few months sets back emissions targets significantly.
From a scientific perspective, this is a vivid demonstration of the gap between policy and physical reality. The atmosphere integrates all emissions, regardless of reason. If Germany burns more coal, global CO2 concentrations continue to rise. There is no opt-out. The recent spike in methane levels from natural gas leaks only compounds the problem. We are playing a game of carbon whac-a-mole, reducing emissions in one sector only to see them pop up in another.
What is needed is honest accounting. The UK government should assess the resilience of its own energy infrastructure against such shocks. The current strategy assumes smooth progress. But history, and certainly climate history, shows only discontinuities. We must build redundancy: more interconnectors to France, Norway, and beyond. More investment in nuclear, which provides firm power. And a realistic appraisal of how long it will take to deploy storage at scale. The Sizewell C project, while essential, will not come online until the 2030s. In the meantime, we are vulnerable.
Germany's potential coal return is not an aberration. It is a signal. For the UK, it should be a catalyst for a more pragmatic, data-driven energy policy that accounts for the contingencies of a warming world and a fractured geopolitical landscape. The goal of net-zero remains necessary, but the path must be robust to failure. The climate does not forgive, and neither should our planning.
