In a stark departure from decades of transatlantic security guarantees, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has confirmed that the United States is permanently reorienting its strategic focus toward Asia, leaving Britain and France to shoulder the burden of European defence. Speaking at the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, Hegseth stated, “The United States is not turning back. Our pivot to the Indo-Pacific is irreversible. Europe must take primary responsibility for its own security.”
This announcement crystallises a realignment that has been underway since the Obama administration but has accelerated under the current geopolitical landscape. The implications are profound. NATO has long relied on the US as its backbone, providing nuclear deterrence, command and control, and the bulk of high-end conventional capabilities. Without US leadership, the alliance faces an existential question: can Europe defend itself?
The logical answer, according to Hegseth, rests with Britain and France. Both nations possess nuclear arsenals, permanent UN Security Council seats, and the most capable militaries in Europe. They also maintain global power projection capabilities—the UK with its carrier strike groups and France with its independent force de frappe. However, the scale of the gap is daunting. The US accounts for roughly 70% of NATO’s defence spending. Even combined, British and French budgets represent less than a third of that.
There are structural challenges too. European militaries have been optimised for expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, not high-intensity conventional war on the continent. Years of underinvestment have left stockpiles depleted and industrial bases hollowed out. The war in Ukraine has laid bare the fragility of European ammunition production, which is only now being ramped up.
The urgency of the situation is compounded by domestic political pressures. In the US, a growing bipartisan consensus argues that European allies have free-ridden for too long. Hegseth’s statement therefore formalises what many in Washington have long believed: that Europe must step up, or risk irrelevance.
For Britain and France, this presents both opportunity and peril. They can shape a new European security architecture, one less dependent on the US. But they must also contend with a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable China, and the lingering effects of Brexit, which has weakened the UK’s diplomatic influence within the EU. The two nations have historically cooperated on defence, but leadership of Europe is a different proposition.
The European Union itself is divided. Eastern member states want a robust NATO commitment, while Western nations are more cautious. France has long advocated for ‘strategic autonomy’ from the US, but has met resistance from countries that see NATO as the ultimate guarantor.
The bottom line, as Hegseth made clear, is that the transatlantic relationship is no longer one of patron and client. It is a partnership of equals, and Europe must now pay its share. The coming months will test whether Britain and France can rise to the occasion, or whether the vacuum they are meant to fill will instead become a void.
