Peru’s electorate has delivered a clear verdict. Rising violent crime and political instability have reshaped the country’s political landscape, with voters flocking to candidates offering a hardline security agenda. The result poses a direct challenge to the United Kingdom’s diplomatic strategy in the region, which has prioritised institutional stability and human rights.
The Peruvian national police reported a 35% increase in homicides in 2024 compared to the previous year. Extortion, kidnapping, and gang violence, long concentrated in rural cocaine-producing areas, have now become endemic in Lima and other urban centres. The recent collapse of the constitutional reform process and the impeachment of two presidents since 2020 have further eroded public trust.
In Sunday’s elections, frontrunner candidate Jorge Alvarez of the National Unity Party campaigned on a platform of “firm hand” security measures, including curfews, expanded military policing, and proposed restrictions on due process for suspected gang members. Exit polls suggest he has secured over 40% of the vote, well ahead of his nearest rival. His rhetoric has resonated with a populace weary of a state unable to protect its citizens.
Britain’s Foreign Office has for years funded judicial training and community policing initiatives in Peru, calibrated to strengthen rule of law and democratic governance. However, the incoming administration may view these programmes as soft power luxuries irrelevant to immediate security needs. The UK’s Ambassador to Peru, Dame Victoria Hart, issued a cautious statement acknowledging the democratic outcome but stressing “the importance of human rights obligations and judicial independence.” Such remarks risk being characterised in Lima as distant and unhelpful.
The strategic implications for Britain are twofold. First, Peru is a cornerstone of the UK’s post-Brexit trade strategy in Latin America, with bilateral trade valued at £1.2 billion in 2023. Alvarez has indicated he will renegotiate existing agreements to prioritise Peruvian security exports, including surveillance technology and small arms. British arms manufacturers may benefit, but at the cost of association with a potentially repressive security apparatus.
Second, the UK’s broader influence in the region relies on its reputation as a promoter of legal norms. If Peru’s new government follows through on its most authoritarian proposals, Britain will face a choice: accommodation for commercial and geopolitical gain, or public condemnation that risks damaging the bilateral relationship.
The situation is being closely watched in neighbouring Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia, where similar security crises are driving voter discontent. For Britain, the Peruvian election is a harbinger. The global wave of democratic backsliding, driven by a politics of fear, is testing the limits of diplomatic engagement. Whitehall has yet to articulate a coherent response to the erosion of its traditional allies’ commitment to liberal governance.
As the results are finalised, British diplomats will need to reckon with a hard truth: the elegance of soft power has found its limit in the grit of street violence. The coming weeks will determine whether Britain can adapt its influence to a new, more pragmatic environment, or whether its voice in Latin America is further diminished.
