Japan’s defence minister has warned that a rapid military build-up is “critical” to deter conflict in the Indo-Pacific, with the UK throwing its weight behind Tokyo’s most aggressive posture since 1945. In an exclusive interview with the BBC, Defence Minister Minoru Kihara argued that “peace through strength” was the only viable strategy given China’s expanding naval reach and North Korea’s missile tests. “We cannot rely on diplomacy alone,” he said. “The window for deterrence is closing.”
The remarks come as Japan unveils plans to hike defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027, matching NATO targets. Tokyo is also in talks to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States, a move that would give it long-range strike capability for the first time. Kihara confirmed that joint exercises with British and Australian forces were set to expand, including “complex scenarios” involving air, sea, and cyber warfare.
Downing Street issued a statement hours later, calling Japan “an indispensable partner” and pledging to “deepen defence cooperation” including a reciprocal access agreement that would allow UK troops to deploy on Japanese soil. This bolsters London’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, formalised in its 2021 Integrated Review. Sources inside the Ministry of Defence confirm that a British carrier strike group is expected to visit Yokosuka naval base next year, with a focus on anti-submarine warfare.
But critics warn of an accelerating arms race. “This is a dangerous escalation,” said Professor Akiko Yamanaka, a strategic studies expert at Waseda University. “Japan is abandoning its pacifist constitution by increments. The public has not been consulted.” Indeed, polls show nearly 60% of Japanese oppose the defence build-up, fearing it drags them into a US-led confrontation with China. Kihara dismissed such concerns as “risk aversion that invites aggression.”
Behind the rhetoric, the financial calculus is stark. Japan’s defence white paper, leaked last week, estimates that China will field 500 naval vessels by 2030, including two aircraft carriers. To counter this, Tokyo plans to procure 12 new submarines and a fleet of F-35B stealth fighters. The cost: an eye-watering ¥40 trillion over a decade. “Follow the money,” said one retired admiral who now advises the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. “This isn’t about peace. It’s about keeping the US defence industry afloat.” He spoke on condition of anonymity.
The UK’s enthusiasm is equally self-serving. Britain’s own defence budget is stretched thin, with unclear commitments to Ukraine and the Middle East. Backing Japan allows London to claim global relevance without deploying large ground forces. “It’s cheap influence,” said a former Foreign Office mandarin. “We get to posture as a Pacific power while Americans pay the bulk of the bill.” Indeed, the US maintains 50,000 troops in Japan, a presence that remains the backbone of regional security.
Yet the gamble is that muscular deterrence works. Kihara pointed to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as proof that weakness invites war. “Putin attacked because he thought Ukraine would not fight,” he said. “We must never give Beijing that impression.” The analogy is imperfect: China has far deeper economic ties with Japan than Russia had with Ukraine. But in the corridors of power, fear of Chinese dominance trumps all other calculations.
What this means for ordinary Japanese is unclear. Military spending will divert funds from pensions and healthcare. Meanwhile, a new law requiring export controls on sensitive technology has alarmed businesses. And the quiet expansion of the Japan Self-Defence Forces into combat roles erodes a post-war taboo. For now, the government counts on a distracted public. “The news cycle moves fast,” a ministry official admitted. “By the time they realise, the money will be spent.”
One thing is certain: the dominoes are falling. Australia has already signed a similar pact with the UK. South Korea is reconsidering its own pacifist limits. And in Washington, planners see Japan’s emergence as a “normal” power as the final piece of a containment strategy against China. The question, as Kihara put it, is whether it’s enough. “We are buying time. But time is not on our side.”
