The World Health Organisation has confirmed a fresh outbreak of Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with at least 23 cases and 11 deaths reported in the province of Équateur. This marks the sixth outbreak in the country since 2018, a sobering reminder that the virus remains a persistent threat. For British policymakers and public health officials, the emergence of this outbreak is not merely a distant humanitarian crisis. It is a direct test of the United Kingdom's commitment to global health security and its ability to project soft power in an era of diminished international coordination.
Ebola, a haemorrhagic fever with a case fatality rate averaging 50 per cent, thrives in fragile health systems. The DRC, already grappling with armed conflict, displacement, and the lingering effects of COVID-19, presents an ideal environment for the virus to spread. The outbreak was declared on 23 April in Mbandaka, a city of 1.2 million people on the banks of the Congo River. Early genomic sequencing suggests the strain is the Zaire strain, for which vaccines and treatments exist. Yet logistical hurdles remain formidable: cold chain storage for vaccines, community mistrust, and poor surveillance networks all undermine containment efforts.
Britain's role in this crisis is rooted in its substantial investment in global health. The UK is the second-largest donor to the WHO and a founding partner of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. British scientists at the University of Oxford and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine have been instrumental in developing the Ebola vaccine and antiviral therapies. However, recent cuts to the overseas aid budget, from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent of gross national income, have raised questions about the sustainability of this leadership. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in 2021, explicitly identifies health security as a pillar of British influence. Now is the moment to demonstrate that resolve.
Cognate to the immediate outbreak response is the broader question of pandemic preparedness. The UK's own experience with COVID-19, where it suffered one of the highest death tolls in Europe, underscores the costs of delayed action. The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Resilience, chaired by former Prime Minister David Cameron, has called for a standing global health emergency workforce. Britain, with its network of overseas development experts and military logistics, could lead such an effort. The Ebola outbreak in the DRC offers a testing ground for these capabilities.
The diplomatic calculus is equally significant. The UK is seeking to deepen its post-Brexit engagement with African nations. Health partnerships provide a neutral, high-impact avenue for building trust. The British High Commission in Kinshasa has already announced support for the WHO-led response, deploying epidemiologists and funding mobile laboratories. But in a week when the UK government has been distracted by domestic scandals and internal party divisions, the risk is that the outbreak slips from top-tier attention. That would be a strategic error.
History warns against complacency. The 2014-2016 West African Ebola epidemic, which killed over 11,000 people, was characterised by a sluggish international response. That failure led to reforms at the WHO and the creation of the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. Yet funding gaps persist. The WHO's current appeal for this outbreak, $15 million, remains only 40 per cent funded. Britain, which hosted the Global Vaccine Summit in 2020 and pledged £1.6 billion to Gavi, could fill that gap and signal that its commitment to global health is not a casualty of austerity.
There is also a direct public health rationale. Viruses do not respect borders. An uncontrolled outbreak in the DRC could spread to neighbouring countries or, via air travel, to Europe. The UK has screening procedures at major airports, but these are only as effective as the surveillance systems in source countries. Investing in containment at source is both a moral imperative and a matter of national self-interest.
The challenge now is to translate words into action. The UK's Global Health Security Programme, launched in 2021, promises to strengthen health systems in vulnerable countries. It must be adequately resourced and prioritised. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should consider seconding British military field hospitals to the DRC, as it did during the 2014 outbreak in Sierra Leone. Such deployments enhance credibility and provide invaluable operational experience.
In the coming weeks, the outbreak's trajectory will depend on the speed and scale of the response. The British government has an opportunity to reassert its role as a trusted partner in global health. To do so, it must act decisively, fund generously, and coordinate closely with international partners. The stakes are high but the tools are proven. Leadership now could shape the narrative of Britain's place in the world for years to come.
