The South China Sea has entered a new phase of strategic competition, with a senior regional diplomat characterised the current environment as a “grab what you can while you can” moment among claimant states. The remark, made during a closed-door session of a Southeast Asian security forum, reflects a growing perception that the legal and diplomatic frameworks governing the disputed waters are eroding.
The shift comes amid a vacuum of effective multilateral enforcement. The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling, which invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims, remains unimplemented. China has continued its construction of artificial islands and deployment of military assets across the Spratly and Paracel chains. Simultaneously, other claimants including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have accelerated their own infrastructure programmes, including airstrips and reconnaissance outposts.
One analyst based in Singapore said the mood in regional capitals had become urgent. “There is a view that the window for securing advantageous positions is closing. The superpower rivalry between the United States and China has created both risks and opportunities. Smaller states are hedging, but also testing boundaries.”
The United States continues freedom-of-navigation operations, though its strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific is increasingly contested by other global priorities. China’s assertion of maritime sovereignty has been consistent and unyielding. The People’s Liberation Army Navy now conducts regular patrols and exercises in the area, while China has deepened its diplomatic engagement with ASEAN, offering economic incentives.
Within ASEAN, consensus on a code of conduct has stalled. The bloc’s inability to present a united front has allowed China to negotiate bilaterally, often from a position of strength. Critics argue that the code, under discussion for decades, will do little to constrain China’s activities.
A European diplomat with experience in the region said the trend toward unilateralism was clear. “What we are seeing is a classic collective action problem. When the rules-based order does not deliver, states fall back on self-help. The result is a more dangerous environment.”
The risk of miscalculation remains high. Recent incidents include the ramming of a Philippine supply ship by a Chinese coast guard vessel near Second Thomas Shoal, and the deployment of naval ships by Malaysia in waters claimed by China’s coast guard. Each incident has been met with calibrated responses, but the potential for escalation is ever present.
For now, the ‘grab what you can’ doctrine prevails. The South China Sea is a laboratory for the future of international law in an era of contested power. The lesson from that laboratory is that might often prevails over right, and that nations without the capacity to enforce their claims will see them ignored.
As one regional official put it: “Those without the means to defend their interests will lose them.” The question is whether the remaining claimants, and the international community, have the will to reverse this trend before it becomes permanent.
