The Horn of Africa is witnessing an escalating security crisis. Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda, has intensified its attacks in Somalia, exploiting political instability and a fragmented security apparatus. As the group expands its reach, British-trained Somali forces are now at the forefront of counter-terrorism efforts, a development that carries both strategic significance and considerable risk.
Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) indicates a 40% increase in al-Shabaab-linked violent events in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the same period last year. The group has shifted tactics, targeting not only military outposts but also civilian infrastructure, including markets and checkpoints. The psychological and economic toll on Somali communities is mounting.
The UK has been a key partner in rebuilding Somalia’s security sector. Through the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), hundreds of Somali soldiers have received instruction in infantry tactics, intelligence gathering, and logistics. These forces are now being deployed in high-risk operations in the Lower Shabelle and Jubaland regions, areas where al-Shabaab retains significant control.
Yet the metrics of success are sobering. Despite a decade of international training programmes, al-Shabaab still controls vast rural territories and conducts regular attacks in Mogadishu. The group’s resilience is a function of its decentralised command structure and ability to exploit local grievances. It funds operations through extortion and charcoal smuggling, generating an estimated $100 million annually.
What makes the current phase particularly dangerous is al-Shabaab’s adaptation to counter-terror tactics. The group has developed sophisticated improvised explosive devices and uses drone surveillance to monitor troop movements. In response, British-trained units are incorporating electronic warfare and intelligence-driven operations, hoping to regain the tactical initiative.
The broader geopolitical context adds another layer of complexity. Somalia’s federal government is embroiled in a constitutional crisis, with regional states like Puntland and Jubaland asserting greater autonomy. This fragmentation limits the reach of national security forces and provides al-Shabaab with operational space. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of African Union peacekeepers, under AMISOM’s successor mission, has created a security vacuum that al-Shabaab is eager to fill.
From a climate security perspective, the region’s recurrent droughts and floods exacerbate instability. Livelihoods are destroyed, making recruitment into militant groups an economic necessity for some. The UK’s investment in stabilisation must therefore be coupled with climate adaptation efforts to address underlying drivers of conflict.
The British-trained forces are a critical asset, but they are not a panacea. Long-term security in Somalia requires political reconciliation, economic development, and regional cooperation. Without these, the threat from al-Shabaab will continue to evolve, and the cycle of violence will persist. The calm urgency of this moment demands a comprehensive strategy, not just military tactics.
