The confirmation of a Trump-aligned outsider as Colombia’s next president is not a diplomatic footnote. It is a structural shift in the South American theatre, and Whitehall must treat it as a strategic vulnerability dressed as an opportunity. The ‘outsider’ label masks a more dangerous reality: a leader unbound by traditional institutional checks, whose campaign was openly backed by a foreign power with a track record of transactional foreign policy. For Her Majesty’s Government, the lure of new trade deals is a distraction from three critical threat vectors: intelligence gaps, supply chain fragility, and the weaponisation of economic dependence.
First, the intelligence failure. Our assessments of Colombian electoral interference have been reactive at best. The United States has been running influence operations in Latin America for decades, but the Trump administration’s methods are less about soft power and more about direct financial and media support for candidates who promise to dismantle multilateral frameworks. We have no clear picture of the quid pro quo that secured this victory. Was it a commitment to scrap the peace deal with FARC dissidents? A guarantee of favourable terms for US military bases? Without granular HUMINT and SIGINT, we are guessing. The new president’s first appointments will reveal the depth of the compromise.
Second, logistics and readiness. British pension funds are already circling Colombia’s infrastructure portfolio: highways, ports, and energy grids. This is precisely the kind of investment that becomes a chokepoint when the political climate turns. If the new administration nationalises assets or imposes punitive tariffs on British firms (as a favour to Washington, which sees UK influence in the hemisphere as a rival), we have no exit strategy. The Ministry of Defence’s Joint Logistics Command should be mapping alternative supply routes for critical minerals, especially copper and lithium, which Colombia controls significant reserves of. A hostile Colombia could cripple the UK’s green tech supply chain within a year.
Third, the cyber domain. This election was won partly through targeted disinformation campaigns operated from outside the country. The same playbook will now be used to destabilise British financial institutions that enter the Colombian market. Expect a wave of ‘hack-and-leak’ operations designed to smear UK executives or compromise contract negotiations. GCHQ must prioritise Colombia as a Tier 1 monitoring zone, not a Tier 2 emerging market. We cannot afford to be caught off guard by a bit-flip that triggers a cross-border data breach.
The official line from the Foreign Office is that this is a chance to ‘diversify trade partnerships and reduce reliance on European markets’. This is naive. In a multi-domain conflict environment, economic interdependence is a vulnerability, not a strength. The new president’s first act may be to repudiate the previous government’s bilateral investment treaty with the UK. If that happens, every infrastructure project currently under due diligence becomes a sunk cost.
We need two immediate actions. First, SIS (MI6) must secure a direct line to the new president’s inner circle. Not through embassy channels, through a cut-out. Second, the National Cyber Security Centre should issue a formal advisory to any British company with Colombian exposure, warning of increased state-sponsored intrusion activity.
This is not fear-mongering. It is threat modelling. The Colombia pivot is a chess piece move by a hostile actor with a history of disregarding rules-based order. British investors should be under no illusion: capital flows can be weaponised. And if we are not careful, the only trade deal we will get is one that surrenders our strategic autonomy for a share of the spoils.
Dominic Croft is a former Army Intelligence officer and now a fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies.
