In a move that has sent ripples through the intelligence community, former President Donald Trump has suggested that a 20-year suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme would be sufficient grounds for the United States to lift economic sanctions. This statement, made during an interview, is being analysed as a potential shift in US strategic posture towards Tehran. However, from a defence and security standpoint, this proposal raises serious questions about threat assessment, verification protocols, and the long-term implications for regional stability.
First, let us examine the timeline. A 20-year suspension is not a permanent rollback. It is a temporary freeze on enrichment activities, leaving Iran’s technical knowledge and infrastructure intact. In the world of nuclear latency, a state that has mastered the fuel cycle can reconstitute weapons-grade material in months, not years. The breakout time, currently estimated at weeks for Iran, would only be marginally extended under such a deal. This is not a strategic victory; it is a temporary pause that gives Iran time to perfect its delivery systems and cyber warfare capabilities.
Second, the verification regime required for such an agreement would be unprecedented. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has struggled to monitor undeclared sites in Iran, as demonstrated by the discovery of enriched uranium particles at Marivan and the recent sabotage of IAEA cameras. Trust, in this context, is a liability. Hostile actors thrive on ambiguity, and a 20-year deal would be a playground for deception. Intelligence failures in the past, such as the underestimation of North Korea’s progress, should serve as a stark warning.
Third, the broader geopolitical chessboard must be considered. Iran’s proxy network across the Middle East Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq operates independently of the nuclear file. Lifting sanctions without addressing these threat vectors would effectively finance Iran’s conventional and unconventional warfare programmes. The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would gain access to hard currency freed from sanctions, accelerating their ballistic missile development and cyber operations against US allies. The strategic pivot from coercion to engagement would be a gift to Russia and China, both of whom seek to expand their influence in the region at Washington’s expense.
Finally, the domestic political dimension cannot be ignored. A 20-year suspension is a long-term bet in a system where administrations change every four to eight years. Even if Trump were to return to office, any agreement he signs could be reversed by a successor, as the JCPOA was dismantled in 2018. Iran’s leadership understands this asymmetry and will likely demand guarantees that the US cannot provide. The offer, therefore, may be a tactical trap designed to shift blame for future escalation onto Washington.
In conclusion, this proposal appears to be a high-risk gamble that underestimates Iranian strategic patience and overestimates the efficacy of temporary constraints. From a military readiness perspective, the US and its allies must assume that Iran will continue to pursue a covert weapons programme regardless of any suspension. The only viable course is to harden defences against missile and cyber threats, maintain a robust intelligence presence in the region, and prepare for the possibility that diplomacy will fail. A 20-year clock is not a solution; it is a deferral of a crisis that will inevitably return with greater force.
