A near-miss at the Barakah nuclear plant in the United Arab Emirates has triggered an urgent review of regional stability protocols. The incident, described by officials as a “close call,” occurred after a strike—likely a drone or missile—came within lethal proximity of the facility’s outer containment. British engineers, deployed as part of a long-standing collaboration with the UAE’s nuclear regulator, are now assessing the structural resilience and procedural safeguards in place.
Data from the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate that the Barakah plant, which came online in 2020, is the Arab world’s first commercial nuclear power station. Its four APR-1400 reactors are designed to withstand impacts from commercial aircraft, but the specific threat vector here—a precision strike from an uncrewed system—raises questions about the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure in conflict zones.
The timing is unfortunate. The Gulf region has been experiencing heightened volatility, with overlapping proxy conflicts and the proliferation of off-the-shelf drone technology. A direct hit on a nuclear reactor would not only cause catastrophic releases of radioactive material but also disrupt baseload power supply across the Emirates. The plant supplies approximately 25% of the country’s electricity, and a shutdown would strand millions in a region already suffering from extreme heat and water scarcity.
From a physical reality perspective, the margin between a near-miss and a disaster is a function of seconds and metres. The containment dome of a pressurized water reactor is engineered to withstand internal pressures of several hundred kilopascals, but external explosions can compromise cooling systems or the control wiring for safety systems. The British engineering team’s preliminary assessment focuses on the latter: verifying that the plant’s emergency shutdown systems remain fully functioning post-incident.
This incident underscores a deeper tension in the global energy transition. Nations like the UAE are investing heavily in nuclear power as a low-carbon alternative to fossil fuels. Yet the security risks of such technology are often understated in economic models. The probability of a containment-breach accident during a reactor’s lifetime might be low, but the consequence—a zone of exclusion the size of a small country—makes risk asymmetry a cruel master.
For the British engineers, the work is painstaking. They are conducting non-destructive testing on concrete structure integrity, checking for micro-fractures that might indicate shockwave damage. They are also reviewing the plant’s “defence in depth” protocols: the layers of redundancy that should prevent any single point of failure from escalating. The fact that the strike got as close as it did suggests a failure in the first layer—active defences such as counter-drone systems or physical barriers.
Regional stability is now a function of communication. The UAE has called for an emergency meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council to discuss shared threat assessments. But the core problem remains that nuclear facilities are uniquely immovable targets in a dynamic security landscape. Unlike a pipeline or a refinery, a reactor cannot be quickly relocated or replaced. Its permanent presence acts as a geographic magnet for adversaries seeking maximum impact.
The broader lesson for energy transition planners is sobering: low-carbon infrastructure must be built with conflict resilience in mind. This means not just hardening reactors but also diversifying the energy mix to reduce the consequences of any single site’s loss. In the meantime, the British assessment teams continue their work, armed with radiological survey meters and a quiet urgency that comes from knowing that the next near-miss might not be a miss at all.
