A critical incident at the Barakah nuclear plant in the United Arab Emirates has once again highlighted the fragile nature of critical infrastructure in the Gulf. According to sources, a sophisticated cyber intrusion attempted to compromise reactor control systems, forcing an emergency shutdown. The attack, attributed to a hostile state actor, was thwarted by a combination of air-gapped networks and rapid human intervention.
This near-miss is a stark reminder that the threat vector for nuclear facilities is no longer limited to physical sabotage. British expertise in civil defence, honed through decades of counter-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection, is now in high demand. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has been quietly advising Gulf states on hardening their energy grids.
But this incident reveals a strategic pivot: adversaries are moving beyond conventional warfare to target the very systems that keep a nation’s lights on. The hardware involved—centrifuges, cooling pumps, and SCADA interfaces—are now prime targets. The intelligence failure here was not technical; it was a failure to anticipate the sophistication of the attack chain.
As the UAE scrambles to assess the damage, the lesson for British defence planners is clear: we must export our civil defence doctrine, not just our weapons systems.
