Colombia’s presidential election has moved to a second round, with voters set to choose between Gustavo Petro, a former guerrilla and leftist radical, and Rodolfo Hernández, a populist billionaire and self-styled outsider. The outcome will have profound implications for the region and for the United Kingdom, which must navigate a deepening ideological divide in Latin America.
Petro, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla group, has pledged to transform Colombia’s economy and society. His platform includes nationalising healthcare, expanding state control over energy, and renegotiating trade deals. He has drawn comparisons to Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, though he has attempted to moderate his image in recent weeks. His running mate, Francia Márquez, is a prominent environmental activist who has faced death threats from paramilitary groups linked to land disputes.
Hernández, a construction magnate and former mayor of Bucaramanga, has run a campaign built on anti-corruption slogans and direct communication via TikTok. He has expressed admiration for Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, and his economic policies favour deregulation and private investment. His penchant for erratic statements has unsettled some investors, but his simple message has resonated with voters weary of traditional politics.
The first round held on 29 May saw ample fragmentation: Petro won 40 per cent, Hernández 28 per cent, and the centre-right candidate Federico Gutiérrez trailed with 24 per cent, despite backing from the conservative establishment. Gutiérrez has since endorsed Hernández, a move that consolidates the anti-Petro vote and creates a coalition between the centre-right and the populist right.
For the United Kingdom, the stakes are high. Colombia is the UK’s third-largest trading partner in Latin America, and a key ally in security and counter-narcotics efforts. British investment in Colombia’s oil and mining sectors runs into billions of pounds. A Petro presidency could threaten the stability of UK-Colombian relations, given his stated intention to halt new oil exploration and review mining contracts. The UK Foreign Office has historically maintained cordial ties with Colombia’s successive conservative governments, and now faces the prospect of dealing with a leader who has called for a “new world order” and criticised Western intervention.
Hernández, by contrast, appears more aligned with UK interests economically, but his unpredictability raises concerns. His comments questioning the 2016 peace deal with the FARC, and his ambivalence towards human rights instruments, could complicate the UK’s stated goal of supporting peace and human rights in Colombia. The UK has been a major donor to the peace process, and any reversal could strain bilateral ties.
Downing Street has thus far adopted a cautious public stance, emphasising the need to work with whichever administration emerges. However, diplomatic sources indicate that quiet contingency planning is underway in the Foreign Office. British officials are likely to adopt a “wait and see” approach, emphasising continuity in development aid and security cooperation while making initial overtures to both camps.
The US role is also critical. The Biden administration has signalled it will deal pragmatically with Petro if he wins, despite his past criticism of American policy. But Washington is aware that Hernández’s pro-Trump rhetoric could energise the most conservative elements of the Republican Party, potentially making bipartisan support for Colombia assistance more complicated.
Colombia faces deep challenges regardless of the result: high poverty, persistent inequality, continuing violence in rural areas, and migration from Venezuela. The next president must also manage the fallout from a global economic slowdown and rising inflation. Whoever wins the 19 June runoff will inherit a fragile country where the UK’s soft power – through the British Council, the Chevening scholarships, and development programmes – could be essential for stabilising the relationship.
The UK has little leverage in this election. Its importance lies in the long game: maintaining institutional ties that transcend individual presidencies. That means preserving the framework for trade, security, and cultural exchange that has been built over decades. Whether Petro or Hernández triumphs, British diplomats will be busy reassuring the new administration of the UK’s commitment to partnership, while subtly encouraging adherence to democratic norms and human rights.
For now, the Foreign Office is following a well-worn path: public neutrality, private engagement, and careful preparation for either outcome. In the transactional environment of modern diplomacy, such patience may prove a valuable asset.
