Sources within the Chinese Foreign Ministry have confirmed that President Xi Jinping is preparing for a rare trip to Pyongyang, his first state visit to North Korea in over a decade. The visit, slated for early next month, is expected to focus on economic cooperation and denuclearisation talks.
This is not a man who travels lightly. Xi’s last bilateral visit to North Korea was in 2005, when he was still a provincial leader. Since becoming president, he has avoided the country, despite repeated invitations from Kim Jong Un. The shift in strategy raises questions. Why now?
The timing is telling. Just last week, the United Nations Security Council met to discuss the latest North Korean missile tests. China, alongside Russia, blocked a US-backed statement condemning the launches. The message was clear: Beijing is asserting its role as a diplomatic gatekeeper on the Korean Peninsula.
But there is more at stake than geopolitics. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and a vital source of fuel and food. The port of Rason, a special economic zone, is a key conduit for Chinese goods. Uncovered documents from the Ministry of Commerce show that bilateral trade reached $2.5 billion last year, a figure that is likely understated given the prevalence of smuggling across the Yalu River.
The visit also comes as Kim Jong Un appears to be pivoting away from complete economic isolation. Pyongyang has ramped up tourism from China, with a reported 200,000 Chinese tourists visiting in 2019 before the pandemic. Diplomatic sources confirm that discussions are underway to reopen the border, which has been closed since early 2020 due to COVID-19.
But the elephant in the room is denuclearisation. Talks between Washington and Pyongyang have been deadlocked since the 2019 Hanoi summit collapsed. Kim has shown no willingness to give up his nuclear arsenal, and the US has refused to ease sanctions. China has proposed a “dual freeze” approach: North Korea stops weapons tests in exchange for a reduction in US-South Korea military exercises. So far, neither side has bitten.
Xi’s visit could be an attempt to broker a new deal. However, given the profound distrust between North Korea and the United States, any agreement would likely be fragile. More cynical observers note that China’s primary interest is in preventing another war on its border while maintaining leverage over Pyongyang.
There is also the domestic angle. Xi is consolidating power ahead of the 20th Party Congress in October, where he is expected to secure a third term as general secretary. A successful diplomatic mission to North Korea would burnish his international credentials and distract from economic troubles at home.
Kim, for his part, needs economic support. The pandemic has battered North Korea’s already feeble economy. Food shortages are reportedly severe, with the World Food Programme warning that over 10 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. China’s aid has been a lifeline, but Kim will be pushing for more: investment in infrastructure, access to Chinese markets, and perhaps even relief from some of the smaller sanctions that Beijing could ease unilaterally.
The visit is not without risks. Xi will be walking a tightrope between showing solidarity with a regime that is widely condemned for its human rights abuses and maintaining China’s image as a responsible global power. Any misstep could be used by Western critics to paint China as a supporter of a rogue state.
But for now, the plans are set. The delegation is being assembled. The gifts are being prepared. And the world watches as two of its most enigmatic leaders prepare to meet behind closed doors. Whatever comes out of that room, one thing is certain: the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is about to change.
