The strategic picture in Myanmar is deteriorating rapidly. Junta forces, bolstered by recent conscription drives, are regaining territory in Shan and Kayah states, reversing gains made by resistance groups in early 2024. This shift presents a clear threat vector: the junta is consolidating its hold on the country, emboldened by arms supplies from Russia and China.
The UK’s sanctions regime, targeted at military-linked entities, is showing critical gaps. Sanctions have failed to stem the flow of jet fuel, which Russia continues to supply, enabling junta air strikes that are decimating civilian areas. Without a strategic pivot to include secondary sanctions on third-party facilitators, the UK risks enabling a hardened junta to sustain its campaign indefinitely.
The human cost is secondary to the geopolitical chess move here: if the junta stabilises, it deepens Myanmar’s role as a client state of Beijing and Moscow, undermining Western influence in the region. The urgent review is not political theatre; it is a necessary correction to a failing policy. Logistics and hardware are the junta’s weaknesses, and the UK must target them ruthlessly.
