A week of intensified Western diplomatic pressure on Moscow has yielded no visible shift in President Vladimir Putin’s posture on Ukraine, according to multiple sources familiar with Kremlin deliberations. The Russian leader has rejected a series of back-channel proposals for a negotiated settlement and instead ordered a further mobilisation of reserve forces, three current and former Russian officials told this correspondent. Their accounts do not alter the overall picture of a Kremlin determined to prosecute its war aims, but they do reveal a growing anxiety inside the presidential administration about the sustainability of public support for the campaign.
The proposals in question, which were relayed through Turkish and Emirati intermediaries, included a phased ceasefire along current front lines, mutual withdrawal of heavy artillery from civilian areas, and a preliminary prisoner exchange mechanism. Putin dismissed them as “attempts to freeze the conflict on terms favourable to Kyiv”, the officials said. Instead, he has instructed the defence ministry to prepare for a renewed offensive in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions, with a target date of late May.
This decision comes despite internal assessments that the Russian army lacks the manpower and munitions to conduct a large-scale breakthrough operation before the autumn. The chief of the general staff, General Valery Gerasimov, privately warned the president that any premature offensive could repeat the failures of last year’s winter campaign, according to a person who attended the briefing. Putin overruled the objection, arguing that Ukraine’s own supply shortages and waning Western resolve offered a window of opportunity.
The risk of a costly stalemate is compounded by signs that Russian society is fracturing under the strain of prolonged conflict. The Kremlin’s own polling data, reviewed by this correspondent, shows a marked decline in the percentage of citizens willing to “endure personal hardship” for the war effort. In February 2024, that figure stood at 63 per cent. By late March, it had dropped to 48 per cent. The most significant decline is among women under 45 and residents of major cities, traditionally the groups least supportive of the conflict.
Internal reports highlight three drivers of this shift: mounting casualties, inflation, and the selective application of mobilisation. The war dead now exceeds 100,000 by the most conservative Western estimates, and the repeated “partial call-ups” have disproportionately targeted rural and ethnic minority regions. In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for example, mobilisation rates are three times the national average, fuelling resentment against the central government. The Kremlin has responded by tightening control over independent media and expanding the definition of “discrediting the armed forces”, but such measures risk further alienating the educated middle class.
Internationally, Russia faces a tightening sanctions regime and the prospect of a unified European response to its latest missile strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The EU is preparing its 14th package of sanctions, including measures targeting the shadow fleet of tankers that export Russian oil. Yet Putin’s calculus depends on a calculation that Western publics will eventually tire of funding Ukraine’s defence. He has ordered his economic advisers to prepare contingency plans for a “long war” lasting into 2026, with the assumption that European patience will break before Russian resolve.
That assumption may prove flawed. A separate Kremlin memo, produced by the presidential administration’s domestic policy directorate, warns that the regime has “exhausted its capacity” for mass mobilisation without triggering significant social unrest. The document, seen by this correspondent, recommends avoiding a second nationwide call-up and instead relying on contract soldiers and volunteer battalions. But these forces are insufficient to replace the experienced units being ground down in the Donbas.
The net effect is an intransigent president and a nervous bureaucracy. Putin continues to project confidence in public, but those closest to him describe a man who has isolated himself from dissenting views. The inner circle has shrunk to a handful of security officials and nationalist ideologues. The result is a decision-making process that prizes ideological consistency over operational reality. Until that changes, the war in Ukraine will continue to exact a heavy toll on both sides. The Kremlin’s fear of a fracturing public is real, but it has not yet translated into a willingness to compromise. The coming weeks will determine whether it will.
